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PARTIES
The caption of this case in the Utah Court of Appeals
shows the names of all parties to the proceeding in the
court below.

Tur Mexico was named as a defendant, but has

not been served and is not a party to this appeal.
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JURISDICTION
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction of this appeal
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §§78-2-2(3)(k), 78-2a-3(2)(j ) . The
Order granting summary judgment was entered on July 10, 199 6
(R.123-24).

Appellant's notice of appeal was filed on August

9, 1996 (R.125-27).

The Utah Supreme Court transferred this

case to the Utah Court of Appeals on or about December 27,
1996.

STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
Summary judgment is proper only when there are no
genuine issues of material fact and the moving party is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
56(c).

Utah R. Civ. P.

Because the court only resolves legal issues on

appeal from a summary judgment, the court does not defer to
the trial court's conclusions of law, but it reviews them
for correctness.
1995).

Averett v. Grange, 909 P.2d 246 (Utah

The following issues are presented for review:

ISSUE I.

Whether the trial court was correct in

finding that the undisputed facts showed no agency
relationship existed between Morris Air and Tur Mexico;
therefore Morris Air cannot be held liable for any
negligence of Tur Mexico or its bus driver.
ISSUF

.

Whether the trial court was correct in
1

finding the contract between Morris Air and Manuel Guevara
clearly and unambiguously states that Morris Air is not
liable for any negligence of ground transportation companies
and others.
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES
This appeal concerns no determinative constitutional
provision, statute, rule or regulation.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case and Course of Proceedings
Plaintiff and appellant Manuel Guevara purchased a Tur
Mexico excursion bus tour of Puerto Vallarta, as well as
charter transport and hotel lodging through Morris Air
Corporation (R.66-68).

While on the bus tour, Mr. Guevara

was injured while walking in front of the bus (R.71-76).
The operator of the bus was Tur Mexico (R.48).
Mr. Guevara filed this action against Morris Air, Inc.
and Tur Mexico, alleging that Tur Mexico was the agent of
Morris Air, and that Morris Air is liable for Tur Mexico's
negligence (R.l-6).

Although Tur Mexico was a named

defendant in this suit, no steps whatsoever have been taken
to prosecute the action against it.
Disposition in Court Below
After both sides conducted discovery over a period of
one year and four months, Morris Air moved for summary
2

judgment on the ground that it could not be held liable for
the negligence of Tur Mexico (R.45-54).

The motion was

briefed by the parties, and oral arguments were heard by
Hon. Sandra Peuler on July 1, 1996.

On that date the judge

granted summary judgment in favor of the defendant.

The

Court explicitly stated the reasons for its decision as
follows:
First of all, with regard to the contract itself,
that was the ticket, and I think that the terms of
that are very clear. And that ticket, that
contract, contains an express disclaimer by Morris
as to the negligence of ground transportation
companies and others. So I think the contract
terms, first of all, negate any actual or express
authority. . . . And in terms of the brochures, I
believe that the brochures, the language in the
brochures simply does not raise any indication of a
principal/agent relationship in the terms that
plaintiff seeks to have the Court find. I think
the contract, going back to that, clearly says what
the relationship is and the brochures do not raise
any inference that are contrary to that.
(R.141-42).

A full copy of Judge Peuler's ruling is

attached as "Addendum A."

Judge Peuler's Order granting

summary judgment was entered on July 10, 1996.

Plaintiff

appeals from this judgment.
Relief Sought on Appeal
Morris Air, Inc. respectfully requests this Court to
affirm summary judgment in its favor.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1. Plaintiff-Appellant Manuel Guevara purchased a Tur
3

Mexico excursion bus tour of Puerto Vallarta, as well as
charter air transport and lodging through Morris Air
Corporation

(R.66-68).

2. Morris Air acted as a travel agent in selling the
optional Tur Mexico bus tour to Mr. Guevara (R.49-52)•
3. Morris Air instructed Mr. Guevara that he did not
have to purchase the excursion bus tour from Morris Air,
that he could, in fact, purchase it in Mexico, but that
Morris Air could offer him a discount on the ticket price he
paid for the tour (R.68).
4. Mr. Guevara chose to purchase the ticket through
Morris Air (R.67).
5. Before Mr. Guevara left Salt Lake City, Morris Air
sent him a "prepaid travel voucher" evidencing his purchase
of the Tur Mexico bus tour.

The voucher states that the

name of the supplier of this "added attraction" is Tur
Mexico (R.99).
6. Morris Air also sent Mr. Guevara a written itinerary
which noted the name of the hotel and also listed the name
and address of Tur Mexico as a provider of "other services"
(R. 81-82).
7. Before Mr. Guevara left Salt Lake City, Morris Air
delivered to him his charter ticket for air travel.
ticket provides at paragraph 13:
4

The

RESPONSIBILITY: FOR PUBLIC CHARTER TRIPS ONLY,
MORRIS AIR SERVICE, INC., acts as principal and
is responsible for making arrangements with
airlines, hotels, ground transportation
companies, and other travel suppliers to provide
the services and accommodations included in the
trip; provided that where MORRIS AIR SERVICE is
the airline, it is responsible for providing
directly to passengers the subject air
transportation. In all other cases, MORRIS AIR
SERVICE acts only as agent of the respective
airliners) and other suppliers, and, as such,
shall not be responsible for the provision or
operation of such flights or other services and
accommodations. In each case, transportation
provided by the airline is subject to all of the
terms and conditions of the respective carrier's
applicable tariff and/or contract of carriage;
refer to the air transportation ticket for
conditions of contract and notice of
incorporated terms, and inguire of the airline
for additional details. Also, other airlines,
hotelsf ground transportation companies, and
other travel suppliers are not agents or
employees of MORRIS AIR SERVICE, but are
independent contractors over whom MORRIS AIR
SERVICE has no control. Accordingly, you hereby
agree that, except as otherwise provided herein,
MORRIS AIR SERVICE is not responsible or liable
for any loss, injury, expensef damage to
property, or personal sickness, injury or death
which results directly or indirectly from (a)
any act or failure to act (including, but not
limited to, delays), whether negligent or
otherwise, of any other airline, hotel, ground
transportation company, or other travel
supplier, or (b) any other cause or act of
whatsoever nature, beyond MORRIS AIR'S direct
and immediate control. Except as otherwise
specified herein, in the event of non-operation
of any Public Charter flight due to reasons
beyond our control, our sole liability shall be
to refund to you that portion of the price
allocable to the services not provided. Any
deviation from the advertised trip which you
initiate is solely your responsibility. Other
matters concerning your responsibilities and
5

ours are as follows:
(R.119)(emphasis added).
8. Mr. Guevara was injured on the Tur Mexico excursion
bus tour, while walking in front of the bus (R.71-76).
Fortunately, he has made a good recovery.
9. Mr. Guevara filed this action against Morris Air,
Inc. and Tur Mexico.

However no steps have been taken to

further prosecute the action against Tur Mexico.
10.

Morris Air moved for summary judgment on the

ground that it could not be held liable for the negligence
of Tur Mexico's bus driver (R.45-54).
11.

There is no known written contract between Morris

Air and Tur Mexico (R.49).1
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
POINT I.
Morris Air

Summary judgment was correctly granted to

on the issue of Morris Air's liability for Tur

Mexico's possible negligence.

Morris Air merely acted as

the travel agent with respect to the Tur Mexico bus

1

Mr. Guevara claims in his brief that the fact that Morris
Air failed to produce in discovery, or even locate, any written
contract between Morris Air and Tur Mexico is not sufficient to
show that Morris Air was only a travel agent in this situation.
However, Morris Air faithfully conducted discovery on this
issue, and if Mr. Guevara was not satisfied with the results of
this discovery, he could have opposed Morris Air's motion for
summary judgment on these grounds, pursuant to Rule 56(f) of the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure (Brief of Appellant, pp. 4,14).
6

excursion.

There is no evidence in the record which

contradicts this assertion.

Morris Air did not represent

that it was a principal and that Tur Mexico was its agent.
Further, there is no evidence that Morris Air had a "right
to control" Tur Mexico, an important element in principalagent relationships.

The trial court found that none of the

evidence raised by plaintiff gave "any indication of a
principal/agent relationship in the terms the plaintiff
seeks to have the Court find" (R.142).

As the travel agent,

Morris Air is not liable for any negligence of the Tur
Mexico bus operation.
POINT II.

Summary judgment was correctly granted to

Morris Air because the contract between Morris Air and
Manuel Guevara clearly and expressly disclaimed Morris Air's
liability for any injuries caused by ground transportation
companies.

When taken as a whole, paragraph 13 of the

contract is unambiguous on this issue.

Further, this

provision unambiguously shows that Tur Mexico was an
independent contractor of Morris Air, not an agent for
Morris Air.

The trial court correctly concluded in its

ruling that no evidence in the record contradicts paragraph
13 of the contract and the record does not raise a material
issue of fact (R.141-42).

7

ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY GRANTED SUMMARY JUDGMENT
TO THE DEFENDANT BECAUSE THE UNDISPUTED FACTS SHOW
THAT MORRIS AIR AND TUR MEXICO DID NOT HAVE A
PRINCIPAL-AGENT RELATIONSHIP.
There is no claim that the driver of the bus was
employed by Morris Air, or by any entity other than Tur
Mexico.

Mr. Guevara does not attempt to argue that the

driver was a servant of Morris Air, and there are no facts
which would support such a claim.

Rather, Mr. Guevara

argues that the driver's possible negligence should be
attributed not only to his employer Tur Mexico, but to
Morris Air, an entirely different business.

Mr. Guevara

makes this leap of logic based solely on the fact that
Morris Air and Tur Mexico did business with each other as
travel agent and supplier of a bus tour, respectively.

The

trial court correctly found that there was no ground for
vicarious liability against Morris Air and dismissed it on
summary judgment.
In a principal-agent relationship, "an agent is a
person authorized by another to act on his behalf and under
his control."

Vina v. Jefferson Insurance Co. of N.Y., 761

P.2d 581, 585 (Utah App. 1988).
generally created contractually,

8

Such a relationship is
where one of the parties

confides the management of some business to be conducted in
his name and by which the other assumes to do the business
and to render an account of it.

The right of the principal

to control the conduct of the agent with respect to matters
entrusted to him is the test of agency, and constitutes an
essential element of the agency relation.

Restatement

(Second) of Agency § 14 (1958).
In determining the status of a principal-agent
relationship, the Utah court has applied a "right to
control" test, similar to the one used to determine the
existence of an employer-employee relationship.

The court

outlined and applied this test in Foster v. Steed, 432 P.2d
60, 62 (Utah 1967) as follows:
In general, the determinative guestion has been
posed as one of "control", the view being that if
the defendant controls, or has the right of
control, the manner in which the operations are to
be carried out, the defendant is liable as a
master, while, if the control extends only to the
result to be achieved, the actor is regarded as an
independent contractor, and the defendant is liable
under neither respondeat superior nor the workmen's
compensation statutes.
In Foster, the court grappled with the guestion of
whether a principal-agent relationship existed between
Texaco Oil Company and

service station operators in

determining whether Texaco could be liable for injuries to a
third person arising out of the tortious conduct of the

9

service station operators.

The trial court denied Texaco's

motion for summary judgment "on the grounds that it cannot
be said that there was no genuine issue as to any material
fact or facts concerning the relationship between Texaco and
the other defendants in the operation of the service
station. . ."

Id. at 61.

Texaco appealed and argued it was

not liable because the service station operators were
independent contractors, not agents of Texaco.
The Utah Supreme Court reversed and remanded for entry
of summary judgment in favor of Texaco.

The court applied

the "right to control" test and asked "whether the oil
company has retained the right to control the details of the
day-to-day operation of the service station; control or
influence over results alone being insufficient."

In

Foster the relationship between Texaco and the station
operators was controlled by a lease and an agreement of
sale.

Under these documents both parties had mutual

obligations regarding the station, but were separate legal
entities, even though the station operated under the Texaco
name. Plaintiff offered the following evidence to contradict
Texaco's claim that the station operators were not agents
and to show that Texaco "controlled" the service station:
Texaco had responsibility for making certain the
building was properly maintained, and its
representatives conducted inspections of the
10

premises. It further effected the needed repairs
after the fire. Wheeler and others were encouraged
to wear the Texaco uniform and to identify with its
products. The only pumps in the station bore the
Texaco trademark, and the sale of any other
products under the Texaco trademark was forbidden.
The manner and nature of delivery of products was
under the control of Texaco, and it was customary
for the operators to buy all items for sale from
Texaco. The company had established criteria for
obtaining operators for their stations, and the
operators attended a school where they received
instructions on marketing, operations, and safety.
All documents evidencing the relationship of the
parties were prepared by Texaco on standard Texaco
letterhead.
Id. at 61.

Plaintiff argued that this evidence should

"create a jury guestion, and that a jury would be acting
reasonably in finding Texaco liable based upon the full
extent of the relationship and involvement of the company."
IdL at 61.

In granting summary judgment for Texaco, the

court focused on the fact that Texaco's witnesses testified
that it "did not set the hours of operation, or control the
hiring or firing of personnel, reguire reports, or prevent
purchasing products from other sources."

Ld. at 61, 63.

The court reasoned that "[t]he areas of mutual contact
demonstrate a mutual interest in the sale of Texaco products
and the success of the business.

None of the evidence cited

by plaintiff indicates that Texaco retained control of the
day-to-day operation but, rather, merely influenced the
result to be achieved, revealing an independent contractor

11

status."

Ld. at 63 .

The Foster decision was approved and followed recently
by the Utah Supreme Court in Glover v. Boy Scouts of
America, 923 P.2d 1383 (Utah 1996), affirming summary
judgment in favor of Boy Scouts of America on the ground
that it did not have the right to control a local
Scoutmaster and therefore could not be found vicariously
liable for his tortious conduct.
A.

Morris Air has never represented that
Tur Mexico was its agent.
In the case at issue, plaintiff argues that Morris Air

is the principal of its agent, Tur Mexico, and therefore is
liable for Tur Mexico's possible negligence.

But Morris Air

was merely a travel agent which sold the ticket for the
excursion bus tour to Mr. Guevara.

Morris Air informed Mr.

Guevara when he called that he did not have to purchase the
excursion bus tour from Morris Air, that he could wait and
purchase such a tour in Mexico, but that Morris Air offered
a discount ticket price on the tour (R.68).

Mr. Guevara

chose to purchase his ticket through Morris Air, rather than
make other arrangements on his own in Mexico.

Tur Mexico

operates its own business running excursion bus tours in
Mexico; Morris Air operates its own business as a charter
air service and as a travel agent for other services in Salt

12

Lake City.
Morris Air.

Tur Mexico never referred to itself as a part of
When Tur Mexico communicated to its customers

in Mexico, it did so on Tur Mexico letterhead.

And Mr.

Guevara received his "prepaid travel voucher" from Morris
Air, the excursion bus tour was listed as being conducted by
Tur Mexico, not Morris Air.

These facts do not support Mr.

Guevara's assertion that Morris Air acted as the principal
and that Tur Mexico was its agent in this situation.
Written materials state that the Morris Air Service
representative in Puerto Vallarta was Tur Mexico (R.79).
This does show a close association between the two, as Mr.
Guevara asserts in his brief.

However, this does not show

that Morris Air had the right or power to control, which is
the requirement for agency.
There is no showing on the record that Tur Mexico's
position as a representative of Morris Air had any
connection with Tur Mexico's operation of the bus tour on
which Mr. Guevara was injured.

Stated differently, there is

no evidence that the operation of the bus tour arose out of
Tur Mexico's role as a representative of Morris Air in
Puerto Vallarta.

On the contrary, since there is no

evidence that Morris Air itself had any role in the bus tour
operation, the only reasonable inference is that Tur
Mexico's bus tour operation was separate and independent
13

from its activity as a local representative for a foreign
travel agent, Morris Air.
B.

Morris Air had no "right to control" Tur Mexico's
operations or activities, including Tur Mexico's
choice of employees and/or the maintenance of Tur
Mexico's vehicles.
The right of the principal to control the conduct of

the agent with respect to matters entrusted to him is the
test of agency, and constitutes an essential element of the
agency relation.

The Foster court relied on whether Texaco

had the right to control the day-to-day operations of the
service station to determine the status of the relationship
between the two.

In this case, any factual "connection"

between Morris Air and Tur Mexico is more tenuous than the
relationship in the Foster case.

The two are completely

separate companies; there is no known written contract
between them; and Morris Air merely sold a Tur Mexico
excursion bus ticket at a discount price to Mr. Guevara.

In

light of the fact that Morris Air had no ability to control
the day-to-day operations of Tur Mexico, let alone the
hiring and firing of its employees and the maintenance of
its vehicles, it would be unjust to hold Morris Air liable
for the negligence of Tur Mexico in this situation, just as
it would be unjust to hold Morris Air liable if a waiter in
the hotel where Mr. Guevara stayed had spilt coffee on and
14

burned him.

Without a right of control, it is not sound

policy to hold Morris Air liable as a principal for another
travel supplier's wrongs.
C.

Mr. Guevara has not offered any evidence to
contradict the fact that Morris acted as a
travel agent in this situation or to raise
an issue of factual dispute.
Mr. Guevara argues that he offered documentary and

testimonial evidence showing Morris Air held Tur Mexico out
as its agent (Appellant's Brief, p. 13). Mr. Guevara
misunderstands the requirement for a fact issue on the
question of agency.

In its ruling, the trial court stated

that it considered Mr. Guevara's evidence, his affidavit and
the documents, but that it "does not raise issues of
material fact as to that contract" and "does not raise any
indication of a principal/agent relationship in the terms
that plaintiff seeks to have the Court find" (R.142).

The

trial court properly disregarded Mr. Guevara's conclusory
opinions in his affidavit about what "one party thought"
about the relationship between Morris Air and Tur Mexico.
"[0]nce a movant sets forth a factual basis for summary
judgment, the opponent must respond with specific facts to
show that there is a genuine issue for trial, and mere
allegations or denials of a pleading or conclusions in an
affidavit are insufficient to raise a genuine issue of

15

fact."

Guardian State Bank v. Roy W. Humpherys, 762 P.2d

1084, 1086 (Utah 1988); Utah R. Civ. P. 56(e).
Plaintiff also argues that the "factual issue" of the
relationship between Morris Air and Tur Mexico could not be
resolved on summary judgment.

But the Foster court, faced

with a more complicated relationship to determine, had no
difficulty granting summary judgment to Texaco on that
issue.

The Foster court reasoned as follows:

Summary judgment is not a substitute for trial but
is rather a judicial search for determining whether
genuine issues exist as to material facts. Rule
56, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, dictates the
granting of summary judgment where there is no
genuine issue of material fact. The plaintiff in
the instant case has attempted to create factual
issues, but the whole purpose of summary judgment
would be defeated if a case could be forced to
trial by a mere assertion that an issue exists.
Foster at 63 (quoting Leininger v. Stearns-Roger
Manufacturing Co., 404 P.2d 33 (Utah 1965).

The mere

existence of factual issues does not preclude summary
judgment so long as the material issues are not in dispute.
Such is the case here.

Further, many other cases

establishing that sellers of travel services are not liable
for the independent negligence of parties performing travel
services, have also been decided on summary judgment.

16

D.

Other courts faced with similar issues have
found no liability of the travel agent for
the negligence of independent contractors.
Cases regarding the liability of travel agents in

similar situations to this one show that the travel agent is
not liable for the negligence of other travel suppliers.
See, Lavine v. General Mills, Inc., 519 Fed. Supp. 332 (N.D.
Ga. 1981), Connolly v. Samuelson, 671 Fed. Supp. 1312 (D.
Kan. 1987), Weiner v. British Overseas Airways Corp., 401
N.Y.S.2d 91 (1978), Dorkin v. American Express Co., 345
N.Y.S.2d 891, Klinghoffer v. Achille Lauro Lines, 816 Fed.
Supp. 934 (S.D.N.Y. 1993), Feig v. American Airlines, Inc.,
167 Fed. Supp. 843 (D.C. 1958), Pena v. Sita World
Travel,Inc., 88 Cal. App.3d 642, 152 Cal. Rptr. 17 (1978).
In each of those cases, the court granted summary judgment
to the defendant travel agent who sold the ticket for the
travel service to the plaintiff.
Mr. Guevara cites cases which appear to support his
assertion that courts do not decide these issues on summary
judgment.

But each of the cases cited by Mr. Guevara deals

with a completely different factual situation and should be
distinguished.
In Casey v. Sanborn, Inc. of Texas, 478 S.W.2d 234
(Tex. App. 1972), the travel agent in Texas and the travel
service, Romfel Travel Service, in Mexico had a contractual
17

relationship establishing that Romfel was Sanborn's agent in
Mexico.

The facts

are closer to the Foster case in that

Romfel used Sanborn's name in its business transactions;
Romfel's address and phone number as Sanborn's "Mexico City
branch office" were listed on the back of Sanborn's
itinerary folder; Romfel's drivers told customers they
worked for Sanborn; and Sanborn picked the tour cars and
drivers.

In short, Sanborn had a right to control several

aspects of Romfel's business.
In Jacobsen v. Princess Hotels International, Inc., 475
N.Y.S.2d 846 (1984), the issue was one of piercing the
corporate veil to determine if the New York courts had
personal jurisdiction of the hotel at issue through the
Princess Hotel's corporate office in New York.

The court

stated,
"[i]t appears there does exist a Princess corporate
structure which may have a bearing on the issues. .
. . Furthermore, there is a distinct possibility of
interlocking relationships which have not been
disclosed. At the least there should be an
opportunity for exploration of the facts in advance
of summary disposition of the issue."
Id. at 848.

The court added, "[o]rdinarily, an independent

travel or booking agent cannot be held responsible for the
negligence of its principal, where the agent simply makes
the reservation or packages the tour."

id. at 848.

Jacobsen court actually interpreted the status of the
18

The

"ordinary" relationship as one where the travel agent is the
agent of its principal, the travel service provider, for
whom the agent is selling the ticket.

In such a case, it

would be illogical to impute liability on the agent when the
principal is negligent and causes injury.
Lastly, in Rookard v. Mexicoachf 680 F.2d 1257 (9th
Cir. 1982), the issue not decided on summary judgment was
whether Mexicoach acted as agent for the customers, and
whether Mexicoach had a duty to warn them about the dangers
of Mexican travel.

The court stated that if Mexicoach had

been acting as agent for Del Pacifico, the bus company, then
it would not be liable.

But the question was whether a

principal-agent relationship existed between the Rookards
and Mexicoach, not between Mexicoach and Del Pacifico.
Such distinctions lie in each case cited by Mr.
Guevara, and none of plaintiff's cases support his assertion
that summary judgment is not proper in cases dealing with
travel agent liability.

In fact, Mr. Guevara's cases seem

to support Morris Air's assertion that a travel agent is not
liable for the tortious conduct of other travel providers by
merely selling the ticket.
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POINT II.
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY GRANTED SUMMARY JUDGMENT
BECAUSE THE CONTRACT BETWEEN MORRIS AIR AND MANUEL
GUEVARA CLEARLY AND EXPRESSLY STATES THAT MORRIS AIR
IS NOT LIABLE FOR ANY NEGLIGENCE OF GROUND
TRANSPORTATION COMPANIES.
The back of Mr. Guevara's airline ticket contained
certain fine print which he claimed to be material to the
relationship between Morris Air and Tur Mexico (R. 108). On
the contrary, the ticket language supports Morris Air's
position.

However, it should be noted that the recital on

the ticket is of limited importance.

The existence of a

principal-agent relationship depends much more on the acts
and conduct of the parties, than on the formality of
agreement, Score v. Wilson, 611 P.2d 367, 369 (Utah 1980)
(dealing with the existence of a joint venture).
Nevertheless, the ticket language was part of the record for
summary judgment, and the trial judge reviewed it for the
purpose of the summary judgment motion.
Mr. Guevara argues that the trial court did not specify
the basis for its decision; however, Judge Peuler's ruling
is very explicit in its reasons for granting summary
judgment to Morris Air.

The trial court stated:

First of all, with regard to the contract itself,
that was the ticket, and I think that the terms of
that are very clear. And that ticket, that
contract, contains an express disclaimer by Morris
as to the negligence of ground transportation
20

companies and others. So I think the contract
terms, first of all, negate any actual or express
authority. . . . And in terms of the brochures, I
believe that the brochures, the language in the
brochures simply does not raise any indication of a
principal/agent relationship in the terms that
plaintiff seeks to have the Court find. I think
the contract, going back to that, clearly says what
the relationship is and the brochures do not raise
any inference that are contrary to that.
(R.141-42).
ticket.

The contract at issue is Mr. Guevara's airline

Mr. Guevara relies on paragraph 13 to assert that

the contract is ambiguous and that Tur Mexico was the agent
for its principal, Morris Air.

Paragraph 13 provides:

RESPONSIBILITY: FOR PUBLIC CHARTER TRIPS ONLY,
MORRIS AIR SERVICE, INC., acts as principal and is
responsible for making arrangements with airlines,
hotelsf ground transportation companies, and other
travel suppliers to provide the services and
accommodations included in the trip; provided that
where MORRIS AIR SERVICE is the airline, it is
responsible for providing directly to passengers
the subject air transportation. In all other
cases, MORRIS AIR SERVICE acts only as agent of the
respective airline(s) and other suppliers, and, as
such, shall not be responsible for the provision or
operation of such flights or other services and
accommodations. In each case, transportation
provided by the airline is subject to all of the
terms and conditions of the respective carrier's
applicable tariff and/or contract of carriage;
refer to the air transportation ticket for
conditions of contract and notice of incorporated
terms, and inquire of the airline for additional
details. Also, other airlines, hotels, ground
transportation companies, and other travel
suppliers are not agents or employees of MORRIS AIR
SERVICE, but are independent contractors over whom
MORRIS AIR SERVICE has no control. Accordingly,
you hereby agree that, except as otherwise provided
herein, MORRIS AIR SERVICE is not responsible or
liable for any loss, injury, expense, damage to
21

propertyF or personal sickness, injury or death
which results directly or indirectly from (a) any
act or failure to act (including, but not limited
tof delays), whether negligent or otherwise, of any
other airline, hotel, ground transportation
company, or other travel supplier, or (b) any other
cause or act of whatsoever nature, beyond MORRIS
AIR'S direct and immediate control. Except as
otherwise specified herein, in the event of nonoperation of any Public Charter flight due to
reasons beyond our control, our sole liability
shall be to refund to you that portion of the price
allocable to the services not provided. Any
deviation from the advertised trip which you
initiate is solely your responsibility. Other
matters concerning your responsibilities and ours
are as follows:
(R.119) (emphasis added).

Mr. Guevara argues that this

paragraph is internally contradictory and ambiguous as a
matter of law.

This is not correct.

When read as a whole,

the paragraph states that Morris Air acts as principal in
making arrangements with travel suppliers to provide their
services and accommodations.

However, such suppliers are

independent contractors over whom Morris Air has no control.
A.

The contract between Morris Air and Manuel Guevara
is not ambiguous as a matter of law.
"A contract is ambiguous only if the words used to

express the meaning and intention of the parties are
insufficient in a sense that the contract may be understood
to reach two or more possible meanings. . . . [h]owever, a
parties' assertion of a different meaning does not in itself
render a contract ambiguous."

Sparrow v. Tayco Const. Co.,
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846 P.2d 1323 (Utah App. 1993).

Mr. Guevara asserts that

because paragraph 13 uses the term "principal" in one
sentence and the term "agent" in another, the contract is
internally contradictory.

To support his proposition, Mr.

Guevara cites Sparrow, a construction contract case where
the parties had used two different price figures for the
same piece of eguipment in two different documents.

The

Sparrow court held this contract ambiguous because it was
unable to determine which price was correct, and the court
admitted extrinsic evidence to properly construe the
contract.

The distinction in Sparrow is that the contract

used two different prices in the sale of the same piece of
eguipment.

In a contract for sale, this is a crucial

factual issue to be determined, over which a genuine,
material dispute has occurred.
Mr. Guevara also relies on Cox v. Cox, 877 P.2d 1262
(Utah App. 1994), as an example of an ambiguous contract.
Cox is a divorce case, where the parties disputed the value
of the house.

The Cox court was left to determine whether

the price figure for the value of the husband's premarital
property in the Agreement could be harmonized with the terms
of the Warranty Deed.

The Agreement failed to state whether

the figure included the value of the house.

Because the

Agreement omitted this material fact, the Cox court stated
23

that the Agreement was ambiguous and allowed extrinsic
evidence to harmonize the two documents as a contemporaneous
whole.
This case is different.

The internal inconsistency

claimed by Mr. Guevara is simply not present.

To understand

the context and application of the paragraph entitled
"RESPONSIBILITY:," paragraph 13 must be looked at as a
whole, not piecemeal.

Paragraph 13 states that for public

charter trips only, Morris acts as principal in its role of
making arrangements with airlines, hotels and ground
transportation companies.

The same paragraph continues that

in all other cases, Morris Air acts only as the (travel)
agent and shall not be responsible for the provision or
operation of the other services.
contradictory.

Such language is not

Paragraph 13 further states that all other

services, including ground transportation, "are not agents
or employees of Morris Air, but are independent contractors
over whom Morris Air has no control."
more clear.

This could not be

Accordingly, Morris Air is not liable for

anything that was "beyond Morris Air's direct and immediate
control."
clear."

As the trial court ruled, this contract is "very
It contains an "express disclaimer" of Morris Air's

liability for others' negligence.

Mr. Guevara's alternative

interpretation of this language, taken out of context, does
24

not render the contract ambiguous as a matter of law.
Further, the trial court considered Mr. Guevara's
affidavit and the brochures he received from both Morris Air
and Tur Mexico before rendering its opinion.

The trial

court properly concluded that this evidence did not raise a
material, factual dispute, did not render the clear language
of the contract ambiguous, and did not contradict that
Morris Air was the travel agent in this situation.
CONCLUSION
There was no principal-agent relationship between
Morris Air and Tur Mexico, and the contract language clearly
disclaims Morris Air's liability.
Morris Air had no right to control the operations of
Tur Mexico.

Tur Mexico was identified clearly to Mr.

Guevara as the supplier of an added attraction, the bus
tour, purchased by Mr. Guevara (R. 81, 99). Further, the
contract clearly disclaimed Morris Air's liability for any
tortious act that was "beyond Morris Air's direct and
immediate control."

It would be unfair to impute liability

to the travel agent merely because it sold a ticket for a
bus tour at a discount price.

25

The judgment of the trial court should be affirmed,
Dated this

(

day of April, 1997.
STRONG & HANNI

/ger H. Bullock
Attorneys for
Defendant/Appellee
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ADDENDUM A:
JUDGE PEULER'S RULING ON
SUMMARY JUDGMENT
(TRANSCRIPT, R. 134-143).
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1

SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH; MONDAY, MARCH 3, 1997; 9:07 AM

2

-oooOooo-

3

[Excerpt of proceedings.]

4

THE COURT:

Let me indicate, counsel, I do

5

appreciate receiving your memos and thought they were both

6

very well written, and looked up a couple of cases and

7

appreciate being able to spend the time doing that.

8

thanks for providing them to me ahead of time.

9
10
11
12
13

The issue that's been argued in this motion for
summary judgment is whether Morris Air, Incorporated is a
principal and can be held liable for the negligence of the
Tour Mexico Bus Company and/or the bus driver.

16
17
18
19
20
21
22

23

So I've had

to take a look at the principal/agency relationship.
Based upon what I've reviewed, my ruling is that

14
15

So

J the defendant's motion for summary judgment should be
granted.

First of all, with regard to the contract itself,

that was the ticket, and I think that the terms of that are
very clear.

And that ticket, that contract, contains an

express disclaimer by Morris as to the negligence of ground
transportation companies and others.

So I think the

contract terms, first of all, negate any actual or express
authority.
The plaintiff's affidavit as to what he

24

understood the terms to be or what he was led to believe,
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based upon conversations with Morris employees, are

1

contrary to the clear terms of the contract.

And since the

2

terms are clear, I don't believe that it's appropriate for

3

the Court to receive extrinsic evidence as to what those

4

terms "one party thought" meant.

5

not raise issues of material fact as to that contract.

And so his affidavit does

And in terms of the brochures, I believe that the

6
7

brochures, the language in the brochures simply does not

8

raise any indication of a principal/agent relationship in

9

the terms that the plaintiff seeks to have the Court find.

10

I think the contract, going back to that, clearly says what

11

the relationship is and the brochures do not raise any

12

inference that are contrary to that.
I think that states everything that I wanted to

13
14

state.

Is there anything that I've left you with a

15

question about or that I've left out?

16

MR. BULLOCK:

17

THE COURT:

Thank you, Your Honor.
All right.

18

counsel.

19

consistent with the ruling.

Thanks for your argument,

I'm going to ask Mr. Bullock to prepare an order

20

MR. BULLOCK:

21

THE COURT:

22

(Whereupon, the requested portion of transcript

23
24
25

Very well.

Thanks.

was completed.)
* * *
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1
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3

STATE OF UTAH

4

COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

}
}
i

ss.

5
6
I, JERI KEARBEY, a Certified Court Transcriber in

7
8

and for the State of Utah, do hereby certify that the foregoing

9

electronically-recorded proceedings were transcribed by me from tapes

10

furnished by the Third Judicial District Court, Division I

11

of the State of Utah;
That pages 1 through

1

3 » both inclusive, represent

1

a full, t r u e , and correct transcript of the testimony given and the

1'

proceedings had on

1!

contains all of the evidence, all of the objections of counsel and rulings

14

of the Court, and all matters to which the same relate.

r

March 3, 1997

DATED this

12th

• and that said transcript

day of

March

1997.
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I hereby affirm that the foregoing transcript was
prepared under my supervision and direction.
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